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I. Introduction
The Presidential election of 2000 forever will be known as
one of the most highly contested elections in United States'
history. After the final tally, a mere 537 votes decided the
presidency.2 One of the key issues at the heart of the election was
the high cost of prescription drugs, especially for senior citizens.3
Both candidates hoped to lower prescription drug prices and, at the
same time, facilitate the entry of generic drugs into the
marketplace to drive down prices. Coincidentally, nearly twenty
years earlier, Congress faced a similar debate. That debate led to
the creation of The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
2 CNN, How We Got Here: A Timeline of the Florida Recount (Dec. 13, 2000),
at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/13/got.here/index.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
3 In the third presidential debate on October 17, 2000, both candidates answered
questions on how they would reform current Medicaid problems and lower the
cost of prescription drugs. George W. Bush replied:
The purchasing powers-and I'm again [sic] price controls. I
think price controls would hurt our ability to continue
important research and development. Drug therapies are
replacing a lot of medicine as we used to know it. One of the
most important things is to continue the research and
development component, and so I'm against price controls.
Expediting drugs through the FDA makes sense, of course.
Allowing the new bill that was passed in the Congress made
sense to allow for, you know, drugs that were sold overseas to
come back, in other countries, to come back into the United
States. That makes sense.
CNN, Campaign 2000: Vice President Gore and Governor Bush Participate in
Third Debate Sponsored by the Commission of Presidential Debates (Oct. 17,
2000), at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/debates/transcripts
/u221017.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).4 id.
Restoration Act ("Hatch-Waxman Act"),5 which dramatically
affected the patent and food and drug laws as well as the manner in
which the pharmaceutical industry operated.
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984
essentially to reverse the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co. 6 In Roche, the
Federal Circuit concluded that a generic drug manufacturer's use
of a patented drug to obtain information needed for the regulatory
approval of its generic drug constituted patent infringement.7 This
decision prevented generic drug manufacturers from using
patented drugs to gather the information needed to obtain pre-
market approval for generic drugs, thereby delaying the marketing
of any generic drugs until the relevant patents had expired. The
pre-market approval process of pharmaceuticals is a lengthy
process that requires the drug manufacturers to comply with
various statutes, regulations, and guidelines set forth by the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA").8 The result of the Roche
decision was that a patentee would continue to enjoy commercial
exclusivity in a practical sense, even after the patent had expired. 9
Congress hoped to remedy this situation by enacting
legislation that would allow generic drug manufacturers to use
patented drugs to obtain pre-market approval, including
"bioequivalency testing. ' 1° Generic drug manufacturers perform
5 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68(b)-(c), 70(b) (1994); 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360(c) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156,
271, 282 (1994)).
6 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984); see H.R.
REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 45 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2467,
2711 ("The provisions of Section [271 (e)] have the net effect of reversing the
holding of the court in Roche.").
7 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
8 See generally Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1994)) (providing that the purpose of this section is to
protect consumers from dangerous food and drug products and to set
enforcement standards which will be used to safeguard the public health).
9 Such a result would also hinder the purpose of the patent, which is to "promote
the progress of science and useful arts. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; cl. 8.
'0 See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
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bioequivalency testing to ensure that the generic drug contains the
same amount of active ingredient as the patented drug. "1 To this
end, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which created a safe
harbor by exempting from infringement all conduct "reasonably
related to the development and submission of information"
necessary to obtain regulatory approval. 12 As a result, it was
estimated that, by the end of 2002, generic drugs would account
for over two-thirds of all prescriptions written and approximately
twenty billion dollars in retail.1
3
This Recent Development examines the Federal Circuit's
recent decision in Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA 14 and
argues that the Federal Circuit properly narrowed the scope of the
exemption provided by the § 271 (e)(1) safe harbor provision.
Additionally, this Recent Development proposes that the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari and affirm the Integra decision
because it is consistent with the legislative intent of § 271(e)(1).
Moreover, this Recent Development proposes that Congress should
enact a statute codifying the common law research exemption to
bring the state of patent law in accord with twenty-first century
principles.
II. The Safe Harbor Provision
A. Section 271(e)(1)
Congress enacted § 271(e)(1) as a safe harbor provision to
ensure that generic drugs would be ready for market as soon as any
11 See Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000)
(citing United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 455 (1983)) ("A
generic drug contains the same active ingredients, but not necessarily the same
inactive ingredients, as a brand-name prescription drug.").
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001).
13 C. DANIEL MULLINS ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PROJECTIONS OF DRUG APPROVALS, PATENT EXPIRATIONS, AND GENERIC
ENTRY FROM 2000 TO 2004, at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-
papers/Mullins-Palumbo%20paper-final.htm (Sept. 27, 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
14 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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relevant patents expired. 15 Section 271 (e)(1) provides
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use,
offer to sell, or sell within the United States or
import into the United States a patented invention
... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use,
or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 
1 6
Although the scope of the exemption was initially limited to the
manufacture of drugs, the protection afforded by the section has
since been expanded.
B. Expansion of the Safe Harbor Provision
The first dramatic expansion came in the landmark case, Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 17 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit
held that the law was not limited to "drugs" but included medical
devices subject to FDA approval.18 In affirming the Federal
Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of §
271(e)(1) even further. 19 The Court focused on the phrase "a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs," and considered whether this phrase referred to "an isolated
statutory section" or "to an entire Act.",20 The Court concluded
that the phrase applied to all products subject to approval under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.2  If Congress had
intended to include only drug patents, the Court reasoned, it easily
could have done so by stating that in the statute.2 2 Additionally,
the Court held that "[t]he phrase 'patented invention' in §
15 See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that the intent of Congress was to "allow [generic
manufacturers] to be in a position to market their products as soon as... legally
permissible").
16 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
'7 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), af'd, 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
81d. at 406.
19 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990).20 Id. at 665-66.
2! 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2002); Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679.
22 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669.
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271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related
inventions alone., 23 As a result of Eli Lilly, the safe harbor
provision encompasses not only drugs, but also medical devices,
24food additives, color additives, and human biological products.
Initial § 271(e)(1) jurisprudence also focused on the
interpretation of other key terms and phrases in the safe harbor
provision. The original focus was on the word "solely" and
whether the infringing "uses" related "solely" to seeking regulatory
approval.25 This interpretation helped to narrow the scope of §
271(e)(1) in early federal decisions. However, federal courts have
since concluded that "solely" is correctly read as modifying "uses,"
and is not determinative, expanding the protections of §
271(e)(1). 26
Recent federal district court decisions involving § 271(e)(1)
have addressed whether particular conduct is "reasonably related"
27to obtaining regulatory approval. In Amgen v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel,28 the District Court of Massachusetts concluded that the
phrases "solely for uses reasonably related" and "use solely for
purposes reasonably related" were not the same, the latter being
more restrictive. 29 Generally these decisions have concluded that
only uses reasonably related to gathering data for regulatory
approval are within the safe harbor.30 Such an analysis greatly
23 Id. at 665.
24 Id. at 670-71.
25 See generally Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F.
Supp. 1379, 1395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding that "to establish entitlement
to the statutory exemption, the defendant must demonstrate that it made and
used plasma-derived and recombinant Factor VIII:C preparations solely for the
purpose of meeting FDA reporting requirements").
26 Elan Transdermal, Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1926, 1932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
27 See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D. Mass. 1995)
(concluding that § 271(e)(1) requires a two-step analysis: (i) only otherwise
infringing uses are analyzed under the section; and (ii) only those infringing uses
that are not reasonably related to obtaining regulatory approval are outside of the
safe harbor).
28 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
29 Id. at 107.
30 See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (asking whether "it [would] have been reasonable, objectively, for a
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expanded the protection available to alleged patent infringers.
The most recent and broadest reading of § 271(e)(1) was
rendered by the District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rh6ne-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.31
In this case, the court held that Bristol-Myers' research using
Rh6ne-Poulenc Rorer's patented chemical intermediates to
investigate and identify potential new drug candidates was
protected by the safe harbor provision. 32 The court concluded that
§ 271(e)(1) protects all research, including synthesis of new drug
candidates, their initial testing, and the determination of whether
drug candidates should be pursued.33 Thus, the court concluded
that the § 271 (e)(1) exemption includes all patents covering all
inventions that are involved in the FDA approval process.3 4 The
recent Federal Circuit decision in Integra, therefore, comes at a
time of increasing judicial reluctance to narrow the scope of the
safe harbor provision.
C. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA 35
In Integra, the patentee, Integra, owned patents relating to a
peptide sequence that promoted beneficial cell adhesion to
substrates by interacting with v3 receptors on cell surface
proteins.36 Integra alleged that Merck, which funded research that
used Integra's research tools for identifying compounds that would
block the same receptors, infringed its patents.37 Merck discovered
that blocking these receptors would inhibit the formation of new
party in defendant's situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that the
'use' in question would contribute... to the generation of kinds of information
that was likely to be relevant in the process by which the FDA would decide
whether to approve the product").
3' No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
32 Id. at *7-8.
31 Id. at *8.
34 See id. at *6 (concluding that Bristol-Myers' experiments would contribute to
the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in the FDA
approval process).
" 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).36 Id. at 862.
17 Id. at 863.
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blood vessels and possibly halt tumor growth.38
1. The Majority Opinion
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of
California held that the § 271 (e)(1) exemption did not apply to the
Merck-sponsored research 39 The Federal Circuit affirmed,
focusing its analysis on the legislative intent.4 0 The Federal Circuit
noted that the House Committee that initiated the safe harbor
provision expressly described the pre-market approval activity as
"a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can
establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute. 41 Such an
infringement would only be "de minimis. 42 The Federal Circuit
concluded that because § 271 (e)(1) is limited to activities that are
"solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information" to the FDA, the exemption "cannot
extend at all beyond uses with the reasonable relationship specified
in § 271(e)(l). ' 43 Moreover, the court stated that § 271(e)(1)
"simply does not globally embrace all experimental activity that at
some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval
process.
Additionally, the court concluded that extending §
271(e)(1) to encompass new drug development would not limit the
exemption to instances of de minimis infringement.4 5
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit recognized that a broad
interpretation of § 271(e)(1) would "effectively vitiate the
exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool patents. ' 46
The court stated that an expansive reading of § 271(e)(1) "would
swallow the benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of
38 1d.
39 Id. at 863-64.
40 Id. at 872.
41 Id. at 865 (citing H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2467, 2692).421 d. at 867.
43 Id. at 866.




biotechnological inventions." 47 Finally, the court held that the
Merck-sponsored research was not embraced by the language and
context of the safe harbor provision.
4 8
2. The Dissent
In her dissent, Judge Newman explained that pursuant to
the "common-law" research exemption, the subject matter of
patents might be studied "in order to understand it, or to improve
upon it, or to find a new use for it, or to modify or 'design around'
it."49 Otherwise, a patentee would stop the "advancement of
technology" in a certain field.5 ° In Judge Newman's view, Merck
took a patented product that was of no value in Integra's hands and
improved it.51 The fact that profits were the ultimate goal or hope
of a research effort should not preclude a research effort from the
safe harbor exemption. 52 "The better rule is to recognize the
exemption for research conducted in order to understand or
improve upon or modify the patented subject matter., 53 Although
Judge Newman agreed with the majority that § 271(e)(1) does not
embrace the "development and identification of new drugs," she
argued that Merck's research either was exempt exploratory
47 Id.
48 1d. at 868.
49 Id. at 875 (Newman J., dissenting). The common law research exemption,,
developed in case law since 1813, creates an exception for patent infringement
"solely for research, academic, or experimental purposes." Id. See Whittemore
v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (stating that the
availability of this common law exception to infringement turns on whether a
use for profit was evident or in keeping with the alleged infringer's legitimate
business, and that even "commercial overtones" may take an infringer's activity
out of the exemption); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (concluding that use is disqualified from the exemption if it has the
slightest commercial implication).
50 Integra, 331 F.3d at 875 (Newman J., dissenting).
51 See id. at 876. "Were all research using RGD peptides prohibited until the
Integra/Telios patents expired, not even the patent owner would benefit, for the
patented products had failed in Telios' hands, leaving the patents valueless until
Scripps and Merck made their discoveries . I..." d.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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research or was immunized by § 271(e)(1). 54 "It would be strange
to create an intervening kind of limbo, between exploratory
research subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory immunity,
where the patent is infringed and the activity can be prohibited."55
Judge Newman concluded that such an arrangement would defeat
the purposes of both exemptions, and "the law does not favor such
an illogical outcome. 56
3. Criticism of the Integra Majority
The Federal Circuit's decision in Integra marked a
dramatic reversal in the trend to broadly interpret the scope of drug
development activities exempted from patent infringement by §
271(e)(1).57 Until the Integra decision, "the courts, the bar, and
industry generally shared the view" that the safe harbor provision
exempted any and all activity, including early-stage drug research,
that led to the submission of data for FDA approval. 58 Although
the Federal Circuit achieved the proper outcome, the court's
conclusion that § 271 (e)(1) does not apply to the use of research
tools is open to criticism.
5
54 1d. at 877.
55 Id.
56 id.
57 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Rh6ne-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 C 8833, 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001); Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 3 F.
Supp. 2d (D. Mass. 1998).
58 Carl B. Massey, Jr. & Paul C. Kimball, Federal Circuit Narrows FDA
"Research Exemption" Safe Harbor Under § 271(e)(1): Research Tool Patents
Revived, (June 24, 2003), at Womble Carlyle, http://www.wcsr.com/CM
/News%20Bites/News%20Bites 1662.asp (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology); see Bristol-Myers, 2001 WL 1512597, at *7-8
(concluding that the § 271(e)(1) exemption included all patents covering all
inventions that are used in the FDA approval process).
59 A research tool may be defined very broadly to include the "full range of
resources that scientists use in the laboratory," including "cell lines, monoclonal
antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, .... cloning tools, ....
methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and computer
software." Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 11 (2001) (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF
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The Federal Circuit's analysis of the reasonable
relationship between the use of research tools to identify drug
candidates and the possible submission of information to the FDA
is troubling. For instance, a mere two years earlier Merck's use of
patented research tools would have been exempted under the safe
harbor provision according to the District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 60 That court concluded that there was a
"decent prospect" that the use of the patented tools would
somewhat contribute to the generation of information sought by
the FDA.6' Such analysis is correct, as the plain language of the
statute does not require a showing that the new product would
actually be submitted to the FDA. Additionally, the use of
patented research tools to produce new drug candidates appears to
have a proximate relationship that is "reasonably related" to the
submission of drug information to the FDA. Research tools play
an integral part in the "stream" of drug development, and such use
is not unforeseeable in this process. 62 Nonetheless, the Federal
Circuit never cited nor addressed previous decisions relating to
research-tool infringement. 63 Perhaps, then, the strength of the
Integra majority's rationale lies in its acknowledgement of the
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP
ON RESEARCH TOOLS 3, at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm
(June 4, 1998) [hereinafter NIH Research Tools Report]). However, a research
tool may also be narrowly defined, and this Recent Development limits such an
analysis to those "patented tools used in the development of new
biotechnological or pharmaceutical products that do not themselves physically
incorporate the tool." Id. at 14.
60 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2001 WL 1512597, at *7-8 (holding that the
use of patented research tools to identify drug candidates was exempt under the
safe harbor provision).
61 Id. at *6.
62 See generally Mueller, supra note 59, at 11 ("The problem of access to
patented research tools is currently more acute and better documented in
biotechnology than in any other scientific field. Biotechnology is research
intensive. A high percentage of basic research tools and laboratory techniques
of biotechnology are subject to proprietary restraints such as patents or material
transfer agreements."); Stephen Maebius et al., Preclinical Use of Research Tool
Is Infringement, 25 NAT'L L. J. 14 (concluding that often a screening research
tool is only performed once to identify a drug candidate).
63 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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legislative intent of the Act.
4. Reverting the Safe Harbor Back to Its
Legislative Intent
The Integra majority's proper focus on the legislative
history marked the first time in many safe harbor decisions that the
Federal Circuit considered congressional intent when ruling on the
application of the safe harbor provision.64 Previous interpretations
of § 271 (e)(1), including that of the Supreme Court, demonstrated
the courts' willingness to ignore the statute's legislative history in
favor of its plain language and reluctance to imply limitations the
statute does not require.2 For example, in Eli Lilly, the Court held
that if Congress intended to include only drug patents, it could
easily have done so by drafting the statute to read "[i]t shall not be
an act of infringement to ... use.., a patented drug
invention .... ,66 In reaching its decision, the Integra majority
acknowledged that the objective of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to
"facilitate the immediate entry of safe effective generic drugs into
the marketplace upon expiration of a pioneer drug patent."67 The
court further indicated that § 271(e)(1) should apply only to
bioequivalence testing of generic versions of patented drugs, since
such testing developed as a consequence of the Act. 68 However,
the plain language of the statute states no such limit. In contrast,
64 See generally Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1027-30 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (considering the plain language of the statute and the Supreme Court's
decision in Eli Lilly before deciding that the statute applies to all medical
devices, regardless of FDA classification); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,
991 F.2d 808, 1993 WL 87405, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (concluding that
the defendant's reliance on § 271(e)(1) is not precluded by manifestation of an
intent to commercialize upon FDA approval, and stating that "[i]f the statutory
language is clear, the plain meaning of the statute controls").
65 See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Abtox,
122 F.3d at 1019-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (considering the plain language of the
statute and the Supreme Court's decision in Eli Lilly before deciding that the
statute applies to all medical devices, regardless of FDA classification).
66 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 667.
67 Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67.
68 Id. at 865 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2692).
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the court's language seems to speak for itself-only activities
within a similar category of clinical testing are exempt under §
271(e)(1).
Additionally, the Integra majority focused on the
legislative intent to "vitiate" the rights of patentees owning
research tool patents. 69 The legislative history clearly provides that
Congress did not intend the enactment of the safe harbor provision
to interfere significantly with the rights of the patent holder.
70
Congress intended only a de minimis or negligible encroachment
on the rights of the patentee. 7' The Integra majority concluded
that allowing the use of a research tool in general research to
identify a candidate drug would thereby deprive the patentees of
the benefits of patent protection. 72 Such complete infringement is
obvious, as the research tool achieves its utility when used in the
discovery of new products and technology.73 By concentrating on
the legislative history of the Act, the Integra majority provided a
just basis for the narrowing of the scope of the exemption to reflect
its originally intended purpose.
5. A Narrow or Broad Safe Harbor Provision?
The majority and dissenting opinions in Integra appear to
reflect two schools of thought on the scope of the safe harbor
provision: a narrow interpretation to reflect the congressional
intent and a broad approach to facilitate modem biotechnological
research.74 Proponents of a narrow safe harbor provision, reflected
in Integra's majority opinion, argue that a broadened safe harbor
provision would leave many patentees uncompensated and without
'9 Id. at 867.
70 See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 28, 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2714.
71 See id.
72 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 867.
73 See generally Mueller, supra note 59, at 10-17 (defining what a research tool
is and describing possible uses).
74 See generally id. at 49-66 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of a
broadened versus narrow experimental use exemption and its application on the
use of research tools).
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sufficient incentives to develop new technology. 75 In essence, if
all non-consensual patent users were given a complete exemption
from liability, biotechnology companies could potentially keep
their technology as trade secrets, thus detracting from the
legislative intent of the statute.
76
However, proponents of a broadened § 271 (e)(1), reflected
in Judge Newman's Integra dissent,77 argue that the doctrine
should be expanded in a way that will maximize the development
of important new therapeutic products. 78 This development of new
biotechnology products coincides with the constitutional
underpinnings of the patent system, which is "to promote the
progress of... the useful arts." 79 As Judge Newman argued, by
preventing the research use of inventions disclosed in a patent,
such restrictions would frustrate public policy and hamper
scientific research.8 ° Such debate has continued since the
enactment of § 27 1(e)(1) nineteen years ago and reflects the
original interests of competing drug companies in constructing the
75 See Rich J. Warburg et al., Patentability and Maximum Protection of
Intellectual Property in Proteomics and Genomics, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP.
264, 270-72 (2003) (concluding that if the current views of activities exempted
under the safe harbor provision as expressed by the district court [in Bristol-
Myers] prevail, companies may benefit by making its technology protected as a
trade secret, and noting that such concerns may facilitate more companies to
maintain its technology as a trade secret rather than seeking patent protection).
76 See id.
71 Integra, 331 F.3d at 872 (Newman J., dissenting).
78 See Mueller, supra note 59, at 7 (quoting NIH Research Tools Report, supra
note 59) ("[T]he stacking of intellectual property obligations as successive tools
are used in the course of an extended research project has the potential to
impede or even preclude the development of new and better diagnostic
therapeutic products."); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons Biomedical Research, 280
Scl. 698, 699 (1998).
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman J., dissenting) (stating "[t]hat is how
the patent system has always worked: the patent is infringed by and bars
activity associated with development and commercialization of infringing
subject matter, but the research itself is not prohibited, nor is comparison of the
patented subject matter with improved technology or with designs whose
purpose is to avoid the patent").
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Hatch-Waxman Act. 8 1 Although both sides present sound
arguments, perhaps the Integra decision will provide a chance to
strike an equitable balance between the two factions.
Il. Reconciling Integra with Twenty-First Century
Principles
A. Certiorari to the Supreme Court
In the recent past, the Supreme Court has rendered itself
nearly invisible in patent law.82 Eli Lilly8 3 is the only Supreme
Court ruling on § 271(e)(1). 84 The "structural arrangements in the
early federal judiciary dictated, or at least facilitated, substantial
Supreme Court involvement in patent law.'85 Nevertheless,
structural reorganization of patent law jurisdiction over the past
two decades has conferred on the Supreme Court increasingly
greater discretion to move to the margins of patent law.
86
One author has proposed that the Supreme Court should
follow a "Managerial Model," making the Court a monitor that
steps in to resolve intercircuit conflicts. 87 Although patent law has
81 ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR 70-81
(2002). Senator Hatch explains how the discussions and negotiations between
the generic drug manufacturing representatives and the "brand companies" were
often heated. During one point, Senator Hatch exclaimed, "If you guys don't
stop it, I'm going to kill somebody." However, Senator Hatch later admitted
that this outburst may have been additionally provoked from a throbbing tooth
which needed root canal surgery.
82 E.g., Mark Janis, Patent Law and the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001).
83 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
84 See generally Janis, supra note 82, at 415 ("The Eli Lilly case furnishes even a
less satisfying illustration of the Supreme Court's involvement in substantive
patent law decision making.").
85 Janis, supra note 82, at 389.
86 See id. at 392 ("By designating the Federal Circuit a court of appeals,
Congress also ensured that decisions of the Federal Circuit were reviewable at
the Supreme Court by a grant of certiorari.").
87 Id. at 408. The author also analyzes two other models: an interventionist and
an invisible model. In the interventionist model, the Supreme Court would be
inspired and impelled to guard the balance between incentivizing private
invention and preserving integrity, while routinely exercising certiorari
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no true intercircuit conflicts, the Supreme Court should give
special consideration to dissents in the Federal Circuit and "use the
presence of dissents as the major model impetus for Supreme
Court review.' 88 Additionally, the Managerial Model calls for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in patent cases to "review
substantive patent issues only where there is a compelling issue of
the allocation of power among institutional actors at stake."
89
Integra provides an excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to
act under this model.
Further review of Integra, upon certiorari, would give the
Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify the statute and determine
its scope. In affirming the Federal Circuit's decision in Integra,
the Court could affirmatively revert the safe harbor provision back
to its intended purpose of providing a safe harbor only to generic
drug manufacturers. The Court could establish that clinical testing,
which relates to the bioequivalence testing of a generic drug, is the
lone activity exempt under § 271(e)(1). 90 Such a decision would
help restore the protection once offered to patentees of various
biotechnological products. Thus, the Court could limit the scope
of § 271 (e)(1) and definitively reverse the trend that it first
established thirteen years earlier.
jurisdiction in patent cases in order to write new patent jurisprudence. In the
invisible model, the Supreme Court would allay all authority of substantive law
issues to the Federal Circuit. Under this model, few patentees would ever see
the Supreme Court intercede in patent jurisprudence. Id.
88 Helen W. Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Review,
45 AM. U. L. REv. 1519, 1520 (1996).
89 Janis, supra note 82, at 408. The author advocates that decisions concerning
patent law standards should be understood in terms of the allocation of decision-
making authority, such as delegating the work of articulating and refining these
standards to the Federal Circuit or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Id.
Additionally, the author states that in cases involving other "questions of
administrative law, such as whether the Federal Circuit should accord...
deference to PTO decisions, or procedure.... may be expected to conform with
a managerial model, in which the Supreme Court intervenes as arbiter of a
power struggle among patent law instituitions." Id. at 410.
90 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2001); H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2692.
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B. Congressional Intervention ... Again
Aside from the safe harbor provision provided by §
271(e)(1), case law in the United States also favors a narrow
infringement exemption for research. This common law research
exemption, developed in case law since 1813, creates an exception
for patent infringement "solely for research, academic, or
experimental purposes. ' 9 Availability of this common law
exemption hinges on whether the research use of a patented
invention is in any way commercial or within the legitimate
business of the alleged infringer. Research does not qualify for an
exemption if the infringement is undertaken in the "guise of
scientific inquiry but has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes."92 Additionally, if the infringing use is in
the furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business, then
the research exemption does not apply.93 Therefore, federal courts
must perform tedious analyses to determine if the infringing use
has any commercial overtones while performed in function with
9' See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600) ("[I]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or
for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its
described effects."). The Federal Circuit's only significant holding on the
common law research exemption came in Roche Prod, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm.
Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Roche, the Federal Circuit held that the
research exemption does not exempt activities that are legitimate business
interests or have some other commercial purpose. Id. at 863.
92 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Embrex,
Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see Sawin v.
Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391) (concluding that
patent infringement must concern "the making [of the invention] with an intent
to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment ....
In other words, that the making must be with an intent to... deprive the owner
of the lawful rewards of his discovery").
13 See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[S]o long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for
amusement ... the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense.").
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the alleged infringer's business activities.94 "[I]n the case of
biotechnological research, however, the line between commercial
and noncommercial research is increasingly blurred; virtually all
scientific research, particularly biotechnological research could be
interpreted as within the legitimate business of the user or as
having some commercial purpose." 95 Thus, this blurring of the
line in biotechnological research and the confusion generated from
federal court decisions as to what activities are exempt under §
271 (e)(1) has left this area of patent law somewhat unsettled.
To avoid the confusion of what constitutes an activity
exempt under § 27 1(e)(1) and to protect up-stream patent holders,
Congress should pass legislation similar to the Proposed Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990
("PPCTIA").96 The PPCTIA provided,
It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use
a patented invention solely for research or
experimentation purposes unless the patented
invention has a primary purpose of research or
experimentation. If the patented invention has a
primary purpose of research or experimentation, it
shall not be an act of infringement to manufacture
or use such invention to study, evaluate, or
characterize such invention or to create a product
outside the scope of the patent covering such
invention. This subsection does not apply to a
patented invention to which subsection (e)(1)
applies.97
The purpose of the PPCTIA was to remove confusion in general
patent law, "reduce unnecessary litigation as well as threats of
litigation," and to avoid the negative effect on research and
94 See generally id. at 1355-63 (providing a detailed analysis of whether Duke
University's use of Madey's patented equipment during research was exempt
under the common law experimental use exemption).
95 David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research,
16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 615, 619 (1994).
96 H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), 101st Cong., 2d.Sess. 1 (1990). The PPCTIA was
Congress' attempt to codify the common law research exemption.
97 Id. at 65-66.
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innovation.98 This proposed legislation would encourage research
and experimentation by providing that the making and using of a
patented invention solely for research or experimentation would
not constitute an act of infringement unless the patented invention
had research and experimentation as its primary purpose.99 The
House report accompanying the PPCTIA explained that if the
primary purpose of the invention was research or experimentation,
"such as a transgenic mouse for cancer research or a laboratory
implement such as a microscope," then it would not be an act of
infringement to "(1) study, characterize, or evaluate the invention;
or (2) use the invention to create a product outside the scope of the
patent." 100 Nevertheless, the PPCTIA did not pass, and eventually
was shelved.' 01
Today, similar legislation could potentially remedy the
uncertainty and controversy surrounding § 271(e)(1). Codification
of such legislation would promote the constitutional goal of
promoting innovation and allowing research on a patented
invention, i.e., research to create an improvement or "design
around" that invention, while retaining the prohibition against
98 Id. at 43-44.
99Id. at41.
1oo Id. The report closes with a list of activities that would not constitute patent
infringement under the proposed Act:
(1) testing an invention to determine its sufficiency or to
compare it to prior art; (2) tests to determine how the patented
invention works; (3) experimentation on a patented invention
for the purpose of improving on it or developing a further
patentable invention; (4) experimentation for the purpose of
"designing around" a patented invention; (5) testing to
detennine whether the invention meets the tester's purposes in
anticipation of requesting a license; and (6) academic
instructional experimentation with the invention.
Id. at 44-45.
"' H.R. REP. No. 101-960(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990); see Eyal H.
Barash, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Progress, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
667, 697 (1997). The author provides that some commentators were split on the
utility and appropriateness of the Act. Some argued it would erode the country's
carefully-crafted incentive system and would be devastating. Others thought
this Act would protect university researchers from potential patent infringement
lawsuits for using many other patented inventions.
research using a patented invention.l°2 Also, such a statute would
draw a clear line as to what constitutes patent infringement during
drug development. For example, in Integra,103 Merck's use of a
patented research tool would clearly be an act of infringement
under the PPCTIA. Merck's utilization of Integra's patented
research tool to identify compounds that would block a cell's
surface protein receptors would constitute infringement because
Integra's research tool had the primary purpose of research or
experimentation. However, if Merck merely improved the
research tool in some way, that activity would certainly be
protected under this exemption. Additionally, as Judge Newman
advocated, the legislation would relieve the courts from common
law determination of whether the research use of the invention is in
any way commercial or profit-driven. 0 4 Therefore, this re-
conceptualization of the common law research exemption would
reflect the commercial realities of the twenty-first century research
and development process. 10
The recent Integra decision only confirms the uncertainty
of safe harbor provision exemptions and reveals the need to reform
the provision back to its original intent. Legislation like the
PPCTIA would benefit not only the biotechnology industry but
also help the courts to refine § 271(e)(1) to its stated purpose.
Thus, although the PPCTIA was not passed in 1990, it is time for
Congress to propose such legislation again.
IV. Ex Post Royalty
One short-term solution to alleviate the confusion
generated by § 271 (e)(1) is payment of an ex post royalty. Under
this system, a generic drug manufacturer would be permitted to use
a patented invention in exchange for an ex post royalty payment
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
o4 See id. at 876 (Newman J., dissenting). See generally Madey v. Duke Univ.,
307 F.3d 1351, 1355-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
oS See Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman J., dissenting) (stating that the
"ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful research should not eliminate
the exemption."); Mueller, supra note 59, at 37 (stating that "[p]rofit motive
should no longer be held antiethical to the experimental use doctrine").
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based on the market value of the newly created product.'06 For
example, a drug manufacturer would be allowed a nonconsensual
use of a patented research tool in exchange for a royalty payment
based on the approximate true value of the research tool to the tool
user and the product developer. 107 The research tool patent owner
would be entitled to a royalty stream, while the drug manufacturer
would avoid the burdens of "pre-use license negotiations, up-front
payments, and blocked access to the proprietary research tool.' 10 8
Although the utilization of a royalty approach may trigger
patent misuse or antitrust concerns, the patent community supports
such a system. Royalty system advocates contend that patent
misuse does not occur if the royalties result from a bargained,
arms-length transaction. 109 Additionally, recent Federal Circuit
decisions regarding damages jurisprudence have expanded the
notion of recoverable damages to encompass virtually any type of
economic harm that was "reasonably foreseeable" from the
infringement.' 10 A royalty would lead to less infringement
litigation as well as fewer transactional costs, as such infringement
would be recognized in return for substantial payment. Thus, the
payment of royalties to a patentee would not only continue to
protect its patent rights, but would also allow possible drug
developers to lawfully infringe such patents while continuing to
106 See Mueller, supra note 59, at 58 (proposing the adoption of "a reach-through
royalty structure that would link the royalty payment with the ultimate




109 John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent
Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 449, 461 (1997) ("[I]f
[reach-through royalties] are reasonable, they should be permitted and...
insistence on such terms should not be read as an antitrust violation.").
"10 King Instrument Corp. v. Perego, 72 F.3d 855, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
dissenting from denial of panel rehearing) (characterizing the 1995 Federal
Circuit decision in Rite-Hite as having "expanded legal injury for patent
infringement" and having worked a "fundamental change in patent rights"); see
also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) ("If a particular injury was or should have been reasonably foreseeable by
an infringing competitor in the relevant market, broadly defined, that injury is
generally compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary.").
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facilitate advancements in technology.
V. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit's decision in Integra marked a
dramatic reversal in the expansion of the scope of activities exempt
under § 271(e)(1). The court's decision appeared to refocus the
scope of the safe harbor provision to those purposes expressly
provided in the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Although the Federal Circuit's decision appeared to focus on the
use of research tools in the development of drug products, the
decision applies to all patentable subject matter, and it will
definitively influence later federal decisions regarding § 271(e)(1).
While the Federal Circuit's decision restricted the scope of
the safe harbor provision, the confusion surrounding what
activities are exempt under § 271 (e)(1) may continue. To remedy
this confusion, the Supreme Court and Congress should take action
to refocus the scope of § 27 1(e)(1) to its original intent, and
facilitate the advancement of technology without significantly
violating the rights of patent holders. Nonetheless, until the
Supreme Court or Congress responds, many activities considered
drug development and discovery may no longer be exempt under §
271(e)(1). Biotech companies that utilize patented technology in
pre-clinical research, whether to develop new drugs or generics,
should consider eliminating questionable activities, conduct
traditional non-infringement activities, and, where needed,
investigate licensing options.
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